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Abstract—In this paper we present the multicommodity auc-
tion model BCBT-I that allocates indivisible network resources
among bidders. The approach can be considered as a gener-
alization of the basic multicommodity model for balancing
communication bandwidth trade (BCBT). The BCBT model
assumes that oﬀers concerning inter-node links and point-to-
point bandwidth demands can be realized partially. However,
in the real-world trade there might be a need to include ca-
pacity modularity in the market balancing process. Thus we
state the model for balancing communication bandwidth trade
that takes into account the indivisibility of traded bandwidth
modules. This requires to solve a mixed integer problem and
increases computational complexity. Furthermore, the pricing
issue appears nontrivial, as the dual prices cannot be longer
used to set fair, competitive market prices. For clearing the
market, we examine the multicommodity pricing mechanism
based on diﬀerentiation of buy and sell market prices.
Keywords—bandwidth allocation, indivisible commodities, mod-
ularity, multicommodity trade, pricing.
1. Introduction
In this paper the bandwidth trading is considered from the
viewpoint of network operators, service providers and other
wholesale active market players, buying and selling band-
width. For the purpose of modeling trade of bandwidth
resources in the communication networks, the network con-
sists of nodes connected by links. The capacity of an
inter-node link is the elementary commodity on the band-
width market. However, network resources being traded
can be more complex and can be composed of many links,
i.e., paths, subnetworks.
It is well recognized that the base for bandwidth trading can
be standardized contracts, that use prespeciﬁed amount of
bandwidth [1]. This requires to take into account mod-
ularity of capacity in the trading models. Indivisibility
can be associated with bandwidth sell oﬀers concerning
links or/and bandwidth buy oﬀers concerning end-to-end
network paths. Modularity requirements can be applied in
trading resources of any layer of a communication network
architecture (for example, optical links and synchronous
digital hierarchy (SDH) containers). The size of indivisi-
ble unit of bandwidth may diﬀer depending on the market
considered or even depending on individual oﬀers. For
example, there may be portfolio of synchronous transport
module (STM) contracts. Moreover, buyers may need to
buy a set of diﬀerent bandwidth links to establish connec-
tions. They should not be exposed to risk of buying some
but not all links or risk of buying diﬀerent quantities of
bandwidth on diﬀerent links.
Requirements of bandwidth market participants are diﬃ-
cult to satisfy using bilateral agreements, which are cur-
rently the most popular form of communication bandwidth
trading. Other mechanisms, such as simple auctions and
exchanges aim mainly in facilitating buyer-seller contacts.
Thus, the eﬃcient bandwidth trade requires development of
advanced business tools [2], [3].
To cope with the problem of providing bidders with the
possibility to submit oﬀers for bundles of elementary com-
modities when auctioning indivisible units of bandwidth,
researchers have proposed various rules and approaches.
They can be assigned into two classes: simultaneous,
single link auctions [2], [4]–[6]; and combinatorial auc-
tions [7]. In simultaneous, separate auctions for individual
links a user that wants to buy a certain path must put simul-
taneous bids at all relevant auctions. Then special, itera-
tive mechanisms are required to coordinate individual links-
auctions. This aspect, as well as possible suboptimality are
the main roots of our criticisms for these methods. Combi-
natorial auctions based approaches may be seen as the best
suited approaches for bandwidth trading. However they are
proved to be NP-hard (non-deterministic polynomial-time
hard) which is the main disadvantage pointed out also by
other researchers. Lastly, all the over mentioned approaches
require buyers to specify the particular links that constitute
a desired path. This may lead to welfare ineﬃciency, as
was shown in [8].
In this paper we state a multicommodity auction model
BCBT-I that allocates indivisible network resources among
bidders and provides eﬃcient allocation of indivisible units
of traded bandwidth resources. The model falls into a class
of the multicommodity exchange models, that can provide
eﬃcient resources allocation by solving global economic
surplus (welfare) maximization problem. The basic bal-
ancing communication bandwidth trade (BCBT) model pro-
posed in [8] was the preliminary step in designing eﬃcient
multicommodity bandwidth exchange. The distinguishing
feature of BCBT is that it allows bidders to place buy oﬀers
not for bundled links, but rather for end-to-end connections.
This model is in the form of a linear programming problem
in which many elementary buy and sell oﬀers are simul-
taneously considered. Prices in BCBT model can be set
according to values of appropriate dual prices. However,
the basic BCBT model treats bandwidth as fully divisible
commodity.
In the paper we provide a generalization of BCBT model,
allowing us to consider capacity modularity requirements.
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The issue is nontrivial, as the new model BCBT-I allows
participants to declare diﬀerent sizes of indivisible units of
bandwidth to be traded. Moreover, the pricing issue appears
as dual prices can not be longer used to set fair, competitive
market prices. We examine application of multicommodity
clearing mechanism based on diﬀerentiation of buy and sell
competitive market prices.
The paper is organized as follows. The description of the
BCBT-I model is given in Section 2. Section 3 discusses
application of multicommodity balancing mechanism to fair
distribution of social welfare. Section 4 presents simple
examples illustrating the main features of BCBT-I model.
Section 5 is the summary of the paper.
2. The BCBT-I Model
The BCBT-I model falls into a class of the multicommod-
ity exchange models. It provides a considerable functional
extension to the BCBT model [8], which treats bandwidth
as fully divisible commodities. Buy and sell oﬀers consid-
ered state capacity (appropriately demanded or supplied)
and unit price (appropriately sell or buy). Realization of
sell and buy oﬀers is given by a non-negative variable less
or equal to oﬀered capacity.
Contrary, the BCBT-I model assumes that bandwidth is
traded in indivisible amounts. Besides capacity and unit
price, market participant may declare the size of indivisible
unit of bandwidth in which the submitted oﬀer should be
realized, for example, 155.52 Mbit/s corresponding to one
STM-1 contract. Such a feature may be very valuable in
real trading practises, however it was not addressed by other
researchers dealing with bandwidth indivisibility (see, for
example, [5], [9]).
Market clearing with indivisible bandwidth requires to
solve a mixed integer problem. This leads to integer
variable problems, increasing computational complexity of
the model comparing to simple BCBT model, as prob-
lem changes character from P to NP-hard. Thus applying
BCBT-I for large networks with many market participants
may require some aggregation mechanisms – an issue in-
troduced in [10]. Below we give the statement of mixed
integer formulation of BCBT-I model.
2.1. Mathematical Programming Formulation
The BCBT-I model deﬁnes three sets: network nodes (V ),
buy oﬀers (D) and sell oﬀers (E). Each buy oﬀer d ∈ D
deﬁnes maximum capacity to be bought hd , unit price Ed
and size of indivisible unit in which bandwidth has to be
purchased Md . Each buy oﬀer d ∈ D concerns end-to-end
path, described by the source node sd and sink node td .
Similarly, each sell oﬀer e ∈ E deﬁnes maximum capac-
ity ye, unit price Se and size of indivisible unit in which
bandwidth is oﬀered for sale Me. Sell oﬀers concern partic-
ular links. This relationship is reﬂected by parameters ave
deﬁned for each pair (v,e) ∈ V×E . Parameter ave accepts
three values: 1 if a link connected with oﬀer e originates in
node v, –1 if a link connected with e terminates in node v
and 0 otherwise.
It is assumed that oﬀers can be realized in the indivisible
units of bandwidth, thus xd is the integer variable stating
the number of units Md realized for buy oﬀer d, xe is the
integer variable stating the number of units Me realized for
sell oﬀer e. Non-negative variable xed is continuous and
denotes the bandwidth capacity allocated to sell oﬀer e to
serve buy oﬀer d. The model BCBT-I is formulated as










0 ≤Mdxd ≤ hd , ∀d∈D, (2)
0 ≤Mexe ≤ ye, ∀e∈E , (3)
∑
d∈D
xed ≤ Mexe, ∀e∈E , (4)






Mdxd v = sd
0 v 6= sd ,td
−Mdxd v = td
, ∀v∈V,d∈D, (6)
xd ∈ Z, ∀d ∈ D, (7)
xe ∈ Z, ∀e ∈ E. (8)
The aim of the BCBT-I model is to maximize the economic
welfare, which is the market surplus deﬁned as a diﬀer-
ence between buyers incomes and sellers costs – objec-
tive function (1). First and second group of constraints
set upper and lower bounds on accepted volume of supply
constr. (2) and demand constr. (3). Next two group of
constraints ensure that total bandwidth ﬂow at particular
link will not be greater than realization of sell oﬀer con-
cerning this link constr. (4) and that bandwidth ﬂow at all
links will be non-negative constr. (5). Constraints (6) assert
appropriate bandwidth ﬂow for demand realization of each
buy oﬀer at each node and can be seen as an analogue
to the Kirchhoﬀ’s current law. Two last groups of con-
straints impose indivisibility of demand (7) and supply (8)
realization.
The general BCBT-I model (1)–(8) can be considered in
a few versions, depending on the indivisibility require-
ments, that may appear only on supply or demand side.
For example, if we discard (7) and set Md = 1, for each
d ∈ D, then obtained variant of BCBT-I model considers
bandwidth indivisibility only from supply point of view,
allowing for fully divisible demands realization. Of course,
a symmetrical variant can be created by removing con-
str. (8) and assigning Me = 1, for each e ∈ E . One can
notice then, that BCBT-I is an extension of BCBT model,
as it would result in the same statement if constrains (7)
and (8) would be discarded and all parameters Me and Md
would be set to 1.
2.2. Main Features of the Model
The BCBT-I is an eﬀective model of bandwidth exchange.
Eﬀectiveness is here conceived in the sense of maximizing
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global economic surplus (market surplus). It is achieved
by joint optimization of all submitted buy and sell oﬀers.
For given oﬀers the BCBT-I chooses the best allocation of
bandwidth determining volumes of accepted oﬀers.
For proﬁt maximizing market players, very important in-
dividual goals are the values of economic proﬁts (surplus)
they could get. Moreover, from individual player points
of view, an important feature of the exchange is the “trans-
parency” and fairness conditions of clearing, which encour-
age players to place sincere oﬀers and to use truthful bid-
ding strategies reﬂecting their underlying values. The basic
linear BCBT model provides transparent and fair conditions
of clearing, since the dual prices in the optimal solution
enables setting the competitive market prices for all band-
widths resources on individual links.
In the case of BCBT-I model, the optimal solution deter-
mines the realizations of oﬀers that provides eﬃciency by
maximizing the global surplus. However, the MILP (mixed
integer linear programming) optimization problem BCBT-I
does not provide prices to distribute the surplus between
market participants. Thus, a special pricing mechanism for
fair economic surplus distribution should be provided. For
this purpose the multicommodity balancing mechanism is
applied. It is presented in the section below.
3. Multicommodity Balancing
Mechanism
A good market mechanism should fulﬁll many diﬀerent re-
quirements. From the viewpoint of individual market player
several desired properties can be claimed: maximization
of individual outcome, individual rationality, impartiality,
fairness and simplicity in available strategies [11]. Also
from the global point of view, some features of market
mechanism are strongly preferable: maximization of social
surplus, enabling high competitiveness, budget-balancing,
limiting market power, preventing entry deterrence and pre-
dation, incentive compatibility. Meeting all these require-
ments is impossible, what was already proofed in the ﬁeld
of mechanism design theory (Myerson-Satterthwaite im-
possibility theorem [12]).
In [13] a novel generic approach for clearing and fair so-
cial welfare distribution in general multicommodity auc-
tions with indivisibility and non-convexities was developed.
The method is based on considering two vectors of com-
petitive market clearing sell prices and buy prices of com-
modities and services. The sell and buy prices are dif-
ferentiated to share the (non-negative) costs of necessary
compensations paid to unfairly priced participants. Shar-
ing of the compensation costs allows the market operator
to treat all market participants without discrimination and is
justiﬁed by incentives that should be given to market partic-
ipants to bid fairly. The aim is to oﬀset the ﬁnancial losses
and to provide proﬁt optimality to market participants so
that they break even. The total compensation cost is cal-
culated in addition to the proﬁt (social welfare) objective
function.
The balancing mechanism consists of two steps: allocation
and pricing. In the ﬁrst step a quantity balancing model of
the multicommodity auction is solved – the BCBT-I model
in our case. In the second step of a balancing mechanism,
in order to obtain the best sell and buy competitive prices,
the compensation cost is minimized by solving a payment
problem.
3.1. Allocation and Payment Rule
Both phases of multicommodity balancing mechanism are
performed consecutively. The quantitative balancing is
done ﬁrst. In terms of auction theory it can be treated
as a provider of allocation rule that determines an optimal
selection of sell and buy bids to realization. The opti-
mal solution maximizes the social welfare and assures zero
global proﬁt-optimality loss.
The price determination model can be applied as a separate
pricing step of the market clearing procedure, after allocat-
ing the resources. It allows the market operator to fairly
redistribute the social welfare among market participants,
by computing the best buy and sell prices that minimize
the costs of necessary (non-negative) compensations. As
it was mentioned before, these compensations should be
paid to some market participants to avoid individual proﬁt-
optimality losses, that may occur due to non-convexities
existing in the market.
Problem of setting sell and buy market prices can be for-
mulated as a linear programming task which can be found
in [13]. In this article we only present the basic concept of
this mechanism.
3.2. Cost of Compensations
There are conﬂicts between the centralized maximum wel-
fare goal and the proﬁt-driven goals of independent market
participants. In particular, the centrally imposed allocation
may require some costly oﬀers to be accepted, while reject-
ing other competitive oﬀers, even though these would have
make proﬁt selling the bandwidth under market prices. The
rationality assumption of self-interested market participants
under competition is that neither buyer or seller can will-
ingly accept a loss of proﬁt, if such loss can be avoided,
for example, by reducing consumption, or by making some
links unavailable.
On some markets there may exist constraints that signif-
icantly limit the trade. In such a case rejecting all non-
competitive oﬀers and accepting all competitive oﬀers may
lead to suboptimal solutions according to global welfare
criterion. In order to maximize social surplus there may
be reasonable to impose acceptance (rejection) of some of-
fers that would be rejected (accepted) in the case of market
without constraints.
In the analyzed mechanism, there may happen that a market
participant is forced by the market operator to buy (sell)
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Fig. 1. Supply and demand charts in two cases: equality of sell and buy market price – zero system cost (a); diﬀerentiation of sell and
buy market prices – non-zero system cost (b).
bandwidth when the market price is higher (lower) than its
oﬀered price. To oﬀset the ﬁnancial losses under market
conditions, and to provide the proﬁt optimality to assure
break even, the market participant gets the compensation
equal exactly to the deﬁcit he or she would have under the
market conditions.
Analogously, if a buyer (seller) is competitive with oﬀered
price greater (lower) than the market price, but, due to the
market operator decisions, the allocated amount of band-
width is less then expected, then the market participant
should get compensation equal to the lost opportunity of
gaining surplus.
The overmentioned (non-negative) compensations paid
to some market participants to avoid individual proﬁt-
optimality losses are minimized in the optimization model,
that determines also diﬀerentiated market sell and buy
price. The prices are diﬀerentiated to cover the costs of
compensations and to assure budget-balanced property of
market mechanism.
3.3. Differentiation of Buy and Sell Market Prices
Diﬀerent values of sell and buy market price determine
which part of social surplus is dedicated for covering the
compensations system cost. If system cost of fair global
market distribution is zero, then sell and buy market price
are the same, corresponding to uniform price at perfect
market without any constraints. However, if system cost
is non-zero, then buy market price should be greater than
sell market price in order to ﬁx appropriate part of social
welfare for covering this cost.
In Fig. 1 the supply and demand chart of single commod-
ity is presented. Two diﬀerent situations are considered:
zero system cost and non-zero system cost. In the ﬁrst
case whole social surplus is divided between buyers (Qb)
and sellers (Qs). There is no need for diﬀerentiation of
sell and buy market prices, so only one uniform price is
set. In the second case system cost of compensations C is
not equal zero. Therefore global welfare should be divided
for three parts: buyers surplus (Qb), sellers surplus (Qs)
and surplus dedicated for covering system cost (Qc). In
order to balance the budget, condition Qc = C must be
meet. Determining appropriate size of Qc can be achieved
by diﬀerentiation of sell and buy market price of each
commodity.
4. Case Study
In this section we present simple examples illustrating the
main features of BCBT-I model. Let us consider network
with four nodes and four links – Fig. 2. For each link
Fig. 2. Network resources with sell and buy oﬀers.
depicted by solid arrow there is one sell oﬀer. Parameters
of sell oﬀers are given in the square bracket. First number
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is an unit price and the second number is a maximum ca-
pacity. For example, sell oﬀer with unit price 2 and max-
imum volume 5 is submitted for link connecting nodes A
and B. There are also three buy oﬀers, each connected
with path depicted by dotted arrows. Parameters of buy
oﬀers are given in the parenthesis. First number is an of-
fered price and the second number is a maximum capac-
ity. For example, buy oﬀer with unit price 8 and maxi-
mum capacity 3 is submitted for path connecting nodes A
and D.
Proposed bandwidth exchange model will be considered in
three variants, depending on the bandwidth indivisibility
requirements. In order to solve particular variant we use
the BCBT and BCBT-I, accordingly.
4.1. Fully Divisible Bandwidth
This variant considers bandwidth as fully divisible com-
modity. For market balancing, the BCBT model is used.
Obtained solution is presented in Fig. 3. For each sell oﬀer
the unit price at which seller has sold the bandwidth and
accepted volume are given in the brackets – ﬁrst number
denotes price and the second accepted volume. For each
buy oﬀer the unit price buyer has to pay and accepted vol-
ume are given in parenthesis – ﬁrst number denotes price
and the second accepted volume.
Fig. 3. Solution obtained by the BCBT model in the case of
fully divisible bandwidth.
Global welfare obtained in this variant equals 22.5. Its di-
vision among market players is fair. Oﬀer at link C-D is
partially accepted, therefore price of that link equals market
price. Market prices of other links are higher than appro-
priate oﬀered prices because oﬀers connected with them
are fully accepted. All buy oﬀers are partially accepted.
Thus, prices that buyers have to pay equal their oﬀered
prices.
4.2. Indivisible Bandwidth
This variant considers bandwidth as commodity comprised
of several indivisible units. It is assumed that all buy and
sell oﬀers are realized in the multiple of unit of size 1,
hence all parameters Me and Md are set to the value of 1.
The solution is presented in Fig. 4. Notation of results is
the same as in Fig. 3. Diﬀerences between this solution
and solution given in previous variant are marked by the
bold fold.
Fig. 4. Solution obtained by the BCBT-I model in the case of
indivisible bandwidth.
Global welfare obtained in this variant equals 21. It is
lower than in the previous variant, due to bandwidth in-
divisibility requirement. Market price of link A-B is diﬀer-
entiated: sell market price equals 3.2 and buy market price
equals 3.5. Because volume of oﬀer submitted for that link
equals 4, the part of social welfare dedicated for covering
system cost equals 4 · (3.5−3.2)= 1.2. It is used to pay
compensation to owner of link A-B. Note that although the
oﬀered sell price (2) is lower than market sell price of that
link (3.2), the sell oﬀer is not fully accepted. The maximum
volume is 5 while accepted volume is 4. Owner of this oﬀer
faces proﬁt opportunity loss equals (5−4) · (3.2−2)= 1.2.
The multicommodity balancing mechanism results in max-
imal global welfare achieved with relatively small system
cost.
4.3. Indivisible Bandwidth on the Supply Side Only
This variant assumes that the constraint of bandwidth in-
divisibility is required only on the supply side. All sell
oﬀers are realized in the multiple of unit of size 1, hence
all parameters Me equal 1. Modiﬁed variant of BCBT-I,
without constraints (7) and with all parameters Md set to 1,
gives the solution presented in Fig. 5. Notation of results
is the same as in Fig. 3. Diﬀerences between this solution
and solution given by the BCBT model are marked by the
bold fold.
Global welfare obtained in this variant equals 22. It is
lower than in the ﬁrst variant considering fully divisible
bandwidth and greater than in the second variant consider-
ing indivisible bandwidth on both supply and demand side.
When we compare the allocations, we can see that the ac-
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cepted volume at link C-D equals 2.5 in case of the BCBT
model and 3 in this case. All others values of volumes are
the same in both cases. As total demand equals total supply
in the case of the BCBT model, then in this case supply of
bandwidth is higher than bandwidth demand. The cost of
the excessive supply equals (3−2.5) ·1 = 0.5.
Fig. 5. Solution obtained by variant of the BCBT-I model as-
suming indivisible bandwidth on the supply side only.
When we compare market price of link A-B we can see
that in the ﬁrst variant price equals 3.5. In this variant
market price of that link is diﬀerentiated: sell market price
equals 3.4 and buy market price equals 3.5. Although there
are no system cost of fair global welfare division, the dif-
ferentiation of buy an sell market price allows to cover cost
5 · (3.5−3.4)= 0.5 of superﬂuous supply.
5. Summary
In this paper we presented the multicommodity auction
model BCBT-I for indivisible network resource allocation.
It is an extension of the BTBT market model that considers
bandwidth as fully divisible commodity. Constraints assur-
ing bandwidth indivisibility causes that the BCBT-I model
is formulated as a mixed-integer problem. The BCBT-I
model ensures determining optimal (according to global
welfare) volume of accepted oﬀers. For fair distribution
of social surplus additional mechanism, we examined the
balancing mechanism based on diﬀerentiation of sell and
buy market price. Illustrative examples conﬁrm the pro-
posed model accuracy. Further works are needed to analyze
the computational complexity of the proposed model. The
pricing issues introduced in this paper needs also further,
comprehensive studies.
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